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Under the normative Expected Value (EV) model, multiple outcomes are additive, but in 
everyday worth judgement intuitive averaging prevails.  Young children also use averaging 
in EV judgements, leading to a disordinal, crossover violation of utility when children 
average the part worths of simple gambles involving independent events (Schlottmann, 
2000). This study explored the origins of this averaging bias in children‘s worth judgements, 
assessing whether averaging also appears for riskless judgements and for other types of 
risky judgements.  In Experiment 1, 8-year-olds judged the worth of having either one or 
two squares of chocolates in two formally equivalent tasks: Children made additive worth 
judgements when chocolates varied in size, but used averaging when they varied in winning 
probability. Performance on the EV task was slightly more advanced when risky followed 
riskless judgements, with some evidence of transfer. In Experiment 2, 5-year-olds gave 
additive worth judgements when judging variable fractions of chocolate pies, with displays 
closely parallel to the spinner discs used for the gambles in Experiment 1.  In Experiment 3, 
5-year-olds gave additive worth judgements of gambles in which to win either one or two 
prizes, with alternative rather than independent probabilities of winning. Thus the 
overgeneralisation of averaging processes to EV judgement, while persistent, neither 
reflects a general difficulty with additive value judgement, nor with displays showing 
positive and negative information, nor with risky judgement per se. It may come into play 
because children have difficulty appreciating the implications of independence, apparent 
also in other domains. Despite such difficulty, children realize that risky game outcomes go 
beyond what they can see, and so may apply averaging, as default strategy for population 
judgement, whereas addition might be the default for judging the sample itself.  
 
A core assumption of Expected Value (EV), dictated by the laws of 
probability, is that multiple outcomes are additive. Young children, however, 
violate this assumption, averaging rather than adding the part worth of 
simple gambles (Schlottmann, 2000).  The present study explores the origins 
of this error, and whether it may be reduced. 
From the first year of life, infants are sensitive to probability (Teglas, 
Girotto, Gonzalez & Bonatti, 2007; Xu & Garcia, 2008) and from 4 years 
children make judgements of probability and EV that conform to the 
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normative expectations (for review, see Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2011). 
Studies using Functional Measurement (FM, Anderson, 1981, 1982, 1991, 
1996) have shown that children’s judgements of how easy it is to randomly 
draw a winner marble vary with the number of winners and losers on the 
plate, with a barrel-shaped or fan pattern as predicted by the probability ratio 
model for various designs (Anderson & Schlottmann, 1991; Acredolo, 
O'Connor, Banks, & Horobin, 1989; Wilkening & Anderson, 1991). 
Moreover, children’s judgements of how good it is to play a gamble for a 
prize vary with the likelihood of winning and size of the prize, showing a 
fan-shaped pattern as predicted by the multiplicative EV model (Bayless & 
Schlottmann, 2010; Schlottmann, 2001; Schlottmann & Anderson, 1994; 
Schlottmann & Christoforou, 2005; Schlottmann & Tring, 2005). The 
traditional view (Hoeman & Ross, 1982; Piaget & Inhelder, 1958, 1975) 
saw children as non-probabilistic reasoners, and it is true that neither 
children nor adults are good at explicit reasoning about or computation of 
probabilities, but the FM data show that even young children have good 
intuitive probability understanding. Children’s intuitions cannot be 
discounted as non-probabilistic because of their good structural fit with 
formal probability models.  
Against this background it is surprising that children should have 
difficulty with intuitive EV judgement in situations with multiple outcomes. 
Under the normative model, EVs of each outcome should simply be added, 
and adding would seem to be easier than multiplication (Anderson & Cuneo, 
1982).  However, children average rather than add.   
Schlottmann (2000) had children judge how much they would like a 
game in which they could win a prize if a spinner landed on the winning red 
segment. Children preferred games with a high probability of winning one 
prize over 2-prize games to which a second spinner with an additional half 
chance of winning a second prize had been added, despite the fact that they 
preferred the two-spinner game when the probability of the first prize was 
low. This crossover interaction is a qualitative violation of additive utility, 
under which an additional chance must increase EV; under an adding model, 
if A+B>A then it follows that C+B>C.  
 
Figure 1. Crossover interaction violates EV additivity. (In Schlottmann 
(2000), children preferred single spinner games with high probability of 
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winning the marbles to those with low probability (dashed line). When a 
second spinner with independent probability of winning the skipping 
rope was added (solid line), it raised judgement of low probability 
games, but lowered judgement of high probability games. This is 
ordinally inconsistent with adding.)   
 
This violation of additivity is not restricted to EV or to children. Butzin 
and Anderson (1974) found the same crossover, when children judged how 
much they would like to play with one or two toys of variable attractiveness. 
Gaeth, Levin, Chakraborty and Levin (1990) found it in adults for 
evaluation of consumer goods with various tie-in products, Troutman and 
Shanteau (1976) found it when goods were described by one or two 
attributes of variable value, and Oden and Anderson (1971) found it in 
liking for meals. These crossovers are expected under averaging: A medium 
value pulls up an average of this and a low value, but the same medium 
value pulls down an average of this and a high value. Hsee’s (1998) less-is-
better effect may be yet another example. Averaging processes are also 
pervasive in forming person impressions, which can be seen as a different 
type of value judgement, both in adults (see review in Anderson, 1996) and 
children (Hendrick, Franz & Hoving, 1974). Our initial hypothesis was, 
therefore, that EV averaging appears in overgeneralisation of everyday 
value judgements.   
It is also clear, on the other hand, that even infants have some 
appreciation of additivity, in the sense that if a quantity/numerosity is added 
to an existing quantity/numerosity, then infants have a precise expectation of 
how much more there should be now (Wynn, 1992; Feigenson, Carey & 
Spelke, 2002). This understanding of additive increases is explicitly linked 
to the language of numbers from pre-school age (Hughes, 1986). Thus 
explicit appreciation of additive increases seems to coexist with a tendency 
to use averaging rather than adding in intuitive judgements. 
It might be objected that there is an extensive literature on children’s 
tendency to use additive rather than multiplicative rules for multiplicative 
concepts, such as area or density (Anderson & Cuneo, 1978; Cuneo, 1982; 
Wilkening, 1981; Wolf & Algom, 1987; Andrews, Halford, Murphy & 
Knox, 2009). However, this is a problem of terminology rather than 
substance: Adding and averaging are both adding-type operations that can 
be distinguished only under special circumstances, for instance, by 
comparison of one- and two-value situations, as described above. The 
studies looking at multiplication concepts have simply not distinguished 
adding from averaging. Averaging could conceivably be very wide-spread 
in children’s intuitive judgements.   
The main question addressed in the present study, accordingly, is 
whether children can make additive judgements at all, more specifically, 
whether children would make additive worth judgements at least in riskless 
situations more similar to situations studied in the literature on pre-schoolers 
numerical addition (Hughes, 1986), in which the additive increase in the 
valuable quantity might be more obvious.   
To this end, children in Experiment 1 were invited to help a puppet play 
simple games for one or two chocolate prizes of variable attractiveness.  In 
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the riskless size task, children judged how happy the puppet would be when 
the size of each prize varied.  In the risky EV task children judged how 
happy the puppet would be when the probability of winning each prize 
varied. The riskless and EV tasks were thus formally identical. If children 
are capable of additive worth judgements at all, however, we would expect 
advanced additive performance in the riskless task. 
Children made EV judgements either before or after riskless worth 
judgements. Assuming that children’s judgements in the two tasks differ, we 
can thus also address whether initial experience with additive worth 
improves later performance in the EV task. Such improvement can only be 
interpreted, however, if we also know whether initial averaging experience 
in the EV task impedes subsequent performance in the riskless situation.  
Transfer only in the normative direction, towards additive EV judgements, 
would suggest an increase in children’s understanding.   
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
METHOD 
Participants. Thirty-two 8-year-olds (mean age 8 years 9 months, range 
8 years 3 months to 9 years 7 months, 14 girls) participated. Children were 
volunteers of mixed ability from a single year 4 class at a Sussex, UK, 
primary school (corresponding to US grade 3) with primarily white middle 
class intake. 
 
Materials. The EV game involved paper spinner discs (13.5 cm 
diameter) with variable red (win) and blue (lose) segments. There were discs 
with 7:1 and 1:7 win:lose  proportions used during instruction,  all red and 
all blue anchor spinners, and 1:3 2:2 and 3:1 spinners for the experimental 
stimuli. Discs were placed on a plastic base with a fat grey plastic spinner 
during instruction, but only the paper discs were used for experimental trials. 
Pieces of mock chocolate (9 cm square, 1.5 cm deep boxes, covered in silver 
foil) were the prizes placed by each spinner. The riskless game involved 
only these mock chocolate squares, with 9 and 2 cm squares used for 
instruction/anchors, and 3, 5, 7 cm squares used for the experimental stimuli. 
The response scale had 17 wooden dowels increasing in 1 cm increments 
from 2.5 to 18.5 cm height. Children pointed to a stick to indicate how 
happy a puppet (Lucy Lemur) would be with each game, with bigger sticks 
for better games. Children have successfully used this scale from 4 years 
(Anderson & Schlottmann, 1991; Schlottmann, 2001; Schlottmann & 
Anderson, 1994). Scale usage was elicited in the standard way by instruction 
with end anchors (Anderson, 1982, chapter 1.) 
 
Design. Each child judged the worth of getting either one or two squares 
of chocolates in two formally equivalent tasks: In the risky EV task, children 
judged how happy Lucy would be to play a game for the chocolate(s), with 
one or two spinners varying in probability of winning it. In the riskless size 
task, children judged how happy the puppet would to get one or two 
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chocolates varying in size. In each task, children judged two individually 
randomized replications consisting of a 3x3 within subjects design for the 
two chocolate games, with small, medium and large probability/size of each 
prize, interspersed with 3 games involving only a single chocolate (same 
probabilities/sizes), so there were 24 stimuli in total. Half of the children 
played the riskless game first, half the EV game.   
 
Procedure. Children were tested individually in a single 20 to 30 minute 
session at their school.  First children met Lucy Lemur who liked chocolate 
and needed help to get them.  If the EV task came first, children first saw a 
1:7 red:blue spinner. Children generally knew that it would be easier for this 
spinner to land on blue, the experimenter (E) confirmed that this was 
because there was so much blue, and children were shown a spin. The 7:1 
spinner was introduced in the same way. Then children were told that “red 
wins, blue loses” and children were shown the prizes. Seeing one large 
chocolate they agreed that Lucy would be happy with this, they also agreed 
she would be even happier with two large chocolates, and when both were 
removed they thought she would be sad.  
To introduce 1- and 2-prize games, children then learned that if a 
chocolate was placed by a spinner, this meant Lucy would win it if the 
spinner landed on red. All agreed that Lucy would be happier with a 7:1 
spinner game for a chocolate than with the 1:7 game.  They were then told 
that Lucy can sometimes spin one spinner to play for one chocolate prize 
(one chocolate shown with the 7:1 spinner), but sometimes she gets to spin 
two spinners at the same time, so that she can win two chocolates (a second 
chocolate with 1:7 spinner was added). At this stage, 4 children said that the 
single prize game was better, but were told that 2-prize games are better 
than 1-prize games, because two prizes are better than one. 
The stick scale was introduced, with long sticks for good games, short 
sticks for bad games, and medium sticks for ok games. Children generally 
chose the longest stick for Lucy getting two chocolates for sure, a medium 
stick for a single chocolate, and the shortest stick for no chocolate. Children 
also generally pointed to the longest stick for a game with 2 all-red discs, 
and the shortest stick for an all-blue single disc game; all red and all blue 
anchors were kept beside the corresponding scale ends throughout.   
Children next practiced telling Lucy how good each game was. To start, 
they were reminded that they would see 2-prize games (E points to the long 
sticks) and 1-prize games (E points to the short sticks). Practice trials 
consisted of three single prize games presented in order of increasing worth, 
and three 2-prize games increasing further in worth. If children pointed to 
the highest stick for the high probability 1-prize game they were reminded 
that there were also 2-prize games and that two prizes are better than one, so 
they would run out of sticks if they used the longest stick here. However, 
children were not shown which stick to use. After the practice, Lucy went 
for a sleep and children proceeded with the experimental trials, without 
further feedback. Upon completion of the task, Lucy woke up to admire 
children’s performance, and asked if they could help on a different game.  
Instruction for the riskless game then proceeded in abbreviated manner 
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If the riskless game came first, children first saw the different chocolates. 
All ranked them according to size when asked which Lucy would like best. 
Children were told that sometimes Lucy could have one chocolate, 
sometimes two, and sometimes none, and that she would be happy if she 
won one piece, even happier with two chocolates, but sad if she got none. 
Children were shown a large chocolate, and then a small chocolate was 
added; 1 child thought the single chocolate game was better at this stage, 
and was told again that two chocolates are better than one.   
The scale was introduced in the same manner as before, except that 2 
large squares of chocolate and an empty chocolate wrapper for no chocolate 
were used as anchors. Practice and experimental trials followed, as before. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Figure 2 shows children’s mean worth judgements for one- and two- 
prize games in the EV (left panel) and riskless game (right panel).  The two 
rows are for children who saw EV before riskless games (top), and size 
before EV games (bottom). The data were analysed by mixed model 
ANOVAs for each task, with chocolate 1 and 2 as within- and task order as 
between-subjects factor.  
 
Figure 2. Mean worth judgements for 2-prize games (solid lines) and 1-
rize games (dashed line) in the EV (left) and riskless (right) task, as a 
function of probability/size of chocolate 1 and chocolate 2. (The 
crossover of the dashed line in the EV task indicates averaging, while in 
the riskless task the dashed line lies below the solid lines, indicating 
adding. The averaging crossover is more pronounced in the top panel 
for children making EV judgements first, but less pronounced when the 
riskless task came first in the bottom panel, indicating transfer.) 
 
The near parallelism of the solid curves for 2-prize games in all four 
panels shows that children appropriately considered the worth of both 
outcomes, with effects for chocolate 1 and 2, F(1,60)>137. (All p<0.05 
unless noted.) The slight deviation from parallelism visible in most panels as 
curves converging towards the right led to significant chocolate 1 x 2 
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interactions in both tasks, F(4,120)>5.99. This convergence might reflect a 
slight irregularity in use of the scale, or could indicate minor sub-additivity, 
but in any event the deviation is small. Task order did not affect judgements 
for 2-prize games in either EV or riskless task. 
Comparing across tasks in Figure 2, both chocolate effects were about 1 
point larger in the riskless on the right than in the EV task, F(2,60)>5.30.  
This is a meaningful task adaptation: The chocolate prize in the EV task has 
the same size as the large chocolate in the riskless task, but in the EV task it 
is not won with certainty, only with high probability, leading to slightly 
lower judgements.  
 
Adding in the Riskless Task.  The dashed curve in each panel is for 1-
prize games in which only a single chocolate may be won. Normatively, 
judgements for these games should lie below those for all of the 2-prize 
games, to which a second chocolate has been added. This pattern appears for 
the riskless task in the right panels, regardless of whether this task came first 
or second.  Thus, 1-prize games were worth significantly less than 2-prize 
games with an additional small chance of winning a second chocolate, 
F(1,30)=61.00, MSE=1.64; interactions with size of the first chocolate and 
with task order were not significant, F(2,60)=2.39 and F<1. 
 
Averaging in the EV task.  In the EV task (left panels), in contrast, the 
dashed curve crosses over the solid curves, which qualitatively rules out 
adding and supports averaging.  This is best seen the top left panel. Half a 
chance for the second chocolate raises the judgement when added to a low 
probability of winning the first chocolate (left point on dashed curve 
compared to left point on middle solid curve), but lowers the judgement 
when added to a high chance of winning the first chocolate (right points on 
the same curves).  This is ordinally inconsistent with adding, but predicted 
by averaging. The crossover was reflected in a significant chocolate 1 x 2 
interaction when 1-prize games were compared to 2-prize games with a 
medium probability of winning the second prize, F(2,60)=43.02, MSE=2.78.  
These data replicate Schlottmann (2000). 
 
Transfer in the EV task.  The 3-way interaction with task order was 
also significant for the EV task, F(2,60)=4.42, MSE=2.78, as apparent from 
comparison of the top and bottom left panel. A crossover appears in both 
panels, but it is more pronounced on the top, when the EV task came first, 
than on the bottom when it came second.  In the bottom left panel, the curve 
has sunk somewhat, towards its normative lower position, in what may be 
described as a hybrid pattern between averaging and adding.  
This hybrid pattern indicates transfer, with initial experience in the 
additive riskless task moving subsequent EV judgements slightly closer to 
the additive model.  Note that there was no comparable transfer from EV to 
riskless task: That children used averaging to make EV judgements first did 
not move riskless judgements away from additivity, and the 3-way 
interaction with task order was not significant for the riskless task, 
F(2,60)=1.29, MSE=1.81. Thus the transfer effect here would seem to 
indicate learning, not just blind carry-over. 
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Individual Subjects. We also analysed individual children’s data, to 
check whether the group results were representative of individuals. Of main 
interest was the question whether the hybrid pattern discussed above 
appeared for individuals, or whether the group pattern appeared because 
some children showed an additive, others pure averaging patterns. Because 
single subject ANOVAs have low power, we used a means-based analysis to 
classify individuals (Schlottmann, 2001). Children were grouped as showing 
either averaging (single prize curve reaches/crosses over the medium 2-prize 
curve at high probability of winning the single prize), or a hybrid pattern 
(single prize curve crosses over the low, but not medium 2-prize curve at 
high probability of winning the single prize), or adding (single prize curve 
no higher than the low 2-prize curve at high probability of winning the 
single prize). The distribution of individual patterns is in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Number of children with different response patterns in three experiments 
 
The top rows of Table 1 show that averaging was the majority pattern in 
the EV task, while in the riskless task addition was most frequent, 
confirming the group impression. The other categories appeared with similar, 
lower frequency in each task.   
When different task orders are considered, no clear difference appears 
between the two distributions in the riskless task, but far fewer children 
averaged when the EV task came second, 88% versus 38%. There was, 
however, no corresponding clear increase in hybrid or additive patterns, 
 Averaging Hybrid     Adding  Other 
EXPERIMENT 1 
EV task all 
Riskless task all 
(n=32 8-year-olds per group) ) 
 
20 
4 
 
5 
7 
 
2 
19 
 
5 
2 
EV task (first) 14 2 - - 
EV task (second) 6 3 2 5 
Riskless task (first) 3 3 8 2 
Riskless task (second) 
(n=16 8-year-olds per group) 
1 4 11 - 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Riskless task (mock pies) 
(n=16  5-year-olds) 
 
1 
 
3 
 
10 
 
3 
EXPERIMENT 3 
EV task (alternative outcomes) 
(n=10 5-year-olds) 
 
1 
 
- 
 
7 
 
2 
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instead the largest increase was in unclassifiable patterns. Thus additive 
experience had some effect, but was insufficient to induce correct 
performance. Experience with the additive riskless task may have led to an 
insight that averaging is not appropriate in the subsequent EV task, rather 
than to appreciation of the more appropriate additive idea. Learning here 
may have induced a conflict, rather than provided its resolution.  
To conclude, concerning the sources of children’s averaging error, the 
present study clearly shows that averaging is not simply the default strategy 
reflecting a general difficulty with additive judgements: Children added in 
the riskless task, yet averaged in the EV task. 
It is possible, nevertheless, that addition, while functional in 8-year-olds, 
is not firmly established at this age, with children falling back on averaging 
in more difficult circumstances, e.g., when worth judgement is complicated 
by the presence of uncertainty.  In line with this, individuals (when not 
affected by a preliminary task) almost always used averaging in the EV task, 
with adding in the riskless task used somewhat less frequently. In light of 
the possibility that averaging might precede adding developmentally it 
would seem important to consider younger children’s performance. 
It is also possible that children’s difficulty with the EV task does not 
relate to EV per se, but rather to the presence of the circular spinner discs 
used. The spinners present both positive (red wins) and negative (blue loses) 
information, when the different sized chocolate in the riskless task presented 
only positive “wins”. Averaging might be triggered by the presence of, and 
perceived need to balance, both positive and negative information, rather 
than by EV situations. 
 Experiment 2 therefore tested 5-year-olds in the riskless task only. In 
contrast to Experiment 1, prizes were not chocolate squares, but round 
chocolate pies presented in their tins, with some segments visibly missing, 
which made the pies very similar to the spinner discs used in Experiment 1, 
presenting both positive and negative information. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
METHOD 
Participants. Sixteen 5-year-olds (mean age 5 years 9 months, range 5 
years 5 months to 6 years 3 months, 9 girls) participated. These were year 1 
children (corresponding to US Kindergarden) from the same school as in 
Experiment 1. 
 
Materials.  As in Experiment 1, except that prizes here were mock 
chocolate pies (33.5cm diameter, 1.5cm deep), consisting of silver tins with 
brown cardboard wedges. Seven pies were used in all, with 7:1, 1:7 (pie 
pieces:empty slots) used during instruction, with full and empty tins for the 
anchors, and 1:3, 2:2 and 3:1 pies for the experimental stimuli. 
 
Design and Procedure. Design and procedure were as for the riskless 
task in Experiment 1, except that Lucy had won a competition in a bakery, 
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so she got to take home any chocolate pie left over, not sold, at the end of 
the day.  The different prizes, scale etc. were introduced as in Experiment 1.  
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Figure 3 shows children’s mean worth judgements of 1 and 2 chocolate 
prize wins of variable sizes. The solid lines for 2-prize games again show 
some convergence, i.e., there is possible sub-additivity, but 1-prize games 
(dashed curve) are judged lower in worth throughout, which is again clear 
evidence against averaging, for adding.  
 
Figure 3. Mean worth judgements for 5-year-olds seeing riskless 2-pie 
games (solid lines) and 1-pie games (dashed line). (The 1-pie curve lies 
at the bottom in accord with the additive EV model, but the curve 
convergence for 2-prize games shows some deviations from additivity.)  
 
In line with this view, the ANOVA for the 2-prize games showed main 
effects of pie 1 and 2, F(2,30)>104, as well as an interaction, F(4,60)= 22.92, 
MSE=2.82, reflecting the convergence on the right, possibly due to  ceiling 
effects.  When 1-prize games were compared with games in which a small 
second pie had been added, there were only main effects of pie 1 and 2, 
F(2,30)>81, with F<1 for the interaction. The group impression was 
representative of individual children’s performance, with the majority (10 of 
16 children) showing an adding pattern (Table 1). 
In sum, Experiment 2 shows that even young children aged 5 did not 
average in the riskless task, with judgements clearly reflecting 
understanding that two prizes are better than one. (These young children 
might have had a bit more difficulty with use of the response scale, or they 
may show more subadditivity than the 8-year-olds in Experiment 1, but this 
was not of major concern here). Averaging is also not linked to some 
peculiarity of the circular spinner disc stimuli, as adding appeared here with 
very similar circular stimuli in a riskless task. 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
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The question addressed in Experiment 3 is whether averaging appears 
with any risky EV task.  The EV task of Experiment 1 presented two 
independent events, operationalized with two independent spinners.  Thus 
children could win both, either, or none of the prizes. This, however, is only 
one possible implementation of a two-outcome situation.  
Instead of outcomes being independent, they could be alternatives, i.e., 
mutually exclusive. This can be operationalized with a single spinner that 
has 3 different-coloured segments. In 2-prize games, if the spinner lands on 
one colour, children win one prize, if it lands on the second colour they win 
a second prize, and if it lands on the 3rd colour they win nothing. If 
averaging is linked to risky EV judgements generally for children, then we 
should find the same data pattern here as in Experiment 1. 
 
METHOD 
Participants. Ten 5-year-olds (mean age 5 years 7 months) participated.  
Children were volunteers of mixed ability from a year 1 class at a County 
Durham, UK, primary school with mainly working class intake. 
Materials.  As in Experiment 1, except that a small bag of marbles and a 
skipping rope served as the two prizes. The EV game involved spinner discs 
with red segments to win the marbles, blue segments to win the rope, and 
white segments to lose. An all white disc and a half red, half blue disc were 
used to anchor the scale. Single prize discs with 3:1 and 1:3 red:white and 
blue:white proportion were also used in the introduction. Experimental 1-
prize discs had .125, .25 and .375 probability of the blue outcome, with 1:7, 
2:6 and 3:5 (blue:white) proportion (top row in Figure 4). 2-prize discs 
factorially combined these probabilities with the same probability of the red 
outcome, yielding discs with 1:1:6, 1:2:5, 1:3:4, 2:1:5, 2:2:4, 2:3:3, 3:1:4, 
3:2:3 and 3:3:2 red:blue:white colour proportions (the nine cells in the body 
of Figure 4) 
 
Figure 4. In Experiment 3, 2-prize games with alternative outcomes 
involved factorial combinations of low, medium or high probability of 
the red (top row) and blue (left column) outcomes; 1-prize games only 
had the blue outcome; white was the losing outcome throughout. 
 
Design and Procedure. The design was as for the EV task in 
Experiment 1 and the procedure was analogous.  
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Figure 5 shows children’s mean judgements in the EV task with 
alternative outcomes. Children added in this task as well. The data pattern is 
near parallel for 2-prize games, and the dashed 1-prize curve lies clearly 
below. 
 
Figure 5. Five-year-olds’ mean EV judgements for 2-prize games (solid 
lines) and 1-prize games (dashed line) in Experiment 3, when outcomes 
were mutually exclusive, not independent. (Near parallelism of the 4 
curves, with the 1-prize curve at the bottom, indicates addition.) 
 
For 2-prize games, the ANOVA showed main effects of the probabilities 
of both marble and rope outcome, F(2,18)>78. The interaction was 
significant as well, F(4,36)=5.94, MSE=1.31, however, the curves here 
show some divergence rather than convergence as in the previous studies. 
When 1-prize games without the marbles were compared to games to which 
an additional low chance for the rope outcome had been added, there were 
only main effects of marble and rope, F>14.69, with F(2,18)=1.77, 
MSE=3.42, p=.20 for the interaction, reflecting that the dashed 1-prize curve 
lies clearly below the 2-prize curves, indicating addivity. Table 1 confirms 
that the majority (7 of 10 children) used adding, so the group data are 
representative of individuals.   
In sum, Experiment 3 shows that averaging is not inevitable in risky 
judgements either, even for young 5-year-olds.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this study, 8-year-olds used averaging to judge the worth of games 
involving two independent events, replicating Schlottmann (2000). Much 
younger children, however, made additive worth judgements when 
chocolate prizes varied in size rather than probability, even with positive-
negative displays that were very close to the spinners used in the EV task, 
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and also when two risky outcome were mutually exclusive rather than 
independent.  
Can We Improve EV Additivity in Children? The present study 
showed that the averaging error is not a passing illusion that is easy to 
correct: Additive experience improved subsequent EV judgements slightly, 
but did not make the patterns clearly additive. From the increased variability 
of performance after additive experience one might speculate that this 
experience may have brought children to realize that EV averaging was not 
quite appropriate, but not that addition was the better strategy, highlighting 
the non-obviousness of the additive idea in the EV task.  
 That some transfer occurred nevertheless highlights the potential of FM 
for engineering better understandings. Better transfer tasks might be found 
with time.  The literature on analogical problem solving in young children is 
rife with examples of children only transferring with surface similarity 
between teaching and target tasks (Goswami, 1992).  From this point of 
view, more transfer might be expected if the chocolate pie task of 
Experiment 2, or the alternative probabilities task of Experiment 3 preceded 
the EV task. Whether increased transfer performance with more similar 
stimuli would imply increased understanding is, of course, a different 
question, but perhaps additive experience to dislodge averaging, together 
with explicit instruction on the relevance of addition might work.  
What Is the Origin of EV Averaging? The other main focus here was 
the possible origin of the averaging error in EV judgement; the present 
experiments rule out some likely sources. Most importantly, the three 
studies showed clearly that children are not generally limited to averaging in 
all their intuitive worth judgements. In two riskless tasks and in the risky 
task with exclusive outcomes children had no difficulty expressing in their 
judgements that two prizes are better than one. Importantly, this appeared 
for children as young as 5 years, so it is unlikely that EV averaging is the 
residue of a general tendency to average that is pronounced for young 
children and reduces with age. 
The averaging error is also not a specific response to spinner-like stimuli 
affording an averaging compromise strategy through the presentation of 
both positive and negative information. This is clear from Experiment 2 
with bi-coloured chocolate pies that were visually very similar to the 
spinners in Experiment 1. A demonstration of averaging with non-spinner 
displays, e.g., with blind draws from plates of marbles, would further 
underscore this point, but this is left for future study. 
A third possibility was that children have a problem understanding 
additivity of risky outcomes. However, children added the worth of two 
alternative risky outcomes in Experiment 3.  Note that in Experiment 3 we 
used two different toy prizes as in Schlottmann (2000), not two identical 
chocolates as in Experiment 1. This was done to counter the possibility that 
children might avoid adding component EVs altogether, because children 
might have recognized the equivalence of the two chocolates and then 
judged merely EV of a positive outcome of any colour.  Children would still 
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have to add the two winning areas, but they would not add component EVs, 
in other words, instead of  
(1) r = prvr + pbvb  ,  
children’s strategy might be better described as  
(2) r = p(r+b) v . 
To reduce likelihood of this strategy, Experiment 3 used two different 
toy prizes, however, a small possibility remains that children ignored these 
differences and simply judged the probability of winning a prize. A more 
conclusive test might use two quantitatively very different prizes, making 
the approach of equation (2) manifestly inappropriate. At present, at any rate, 
we would tentatively conclude that children seem to have a problem with 
adding independent risky outcomes, rather than with risky outcomes per se. 
Independent risky outcomes might be more difficult for children than 
alternative risky outcomes, because children need to keep more possibilities 
in mind than they can see:  They may not just win v1 or v2, but they could 
also win both v1 and v2. Both p1v1 and p2v2 are visually presented, but p1p2 
(v1+v2) is not. Moreover, since the probabilities of all possible outcomes 
sum to 1, EV of winning only v1 is not actually p1v1, as visually presented, 
but p1(1-p2)v1, and similarly for v2. Of course, children need not make the 
relevant computations, but it is crucial for them to understand that there are 
three possible non-zero outcomes, not just two, with the third option the 
intersection of the others.  
Difficulty with understanding independent events appears in other 
research domains as well.  In the logical reasoning literature, some argue 
that children first interpret the connective ‘or’ as meaning one or the other, 
but not both, with the inclusive interpretation appearing years later (Braine 
& Rumain, 1983). The literature on causal reasoning generally shows that 
children from 2 or 3 years have no difficulty with the idea that if one cause 
operates, then another does not, while the possibility of two causes operating 
together seems never considered, with backwards blocking in children’s 
causal attributions (Sobel, Tenenbaum, & Gopnik, 2004), and non-
normative causal discounting in conditional reasoning (Ali, Schlottmann, 
Shaw, Chater & Oaksford, 2010). Crain (2008) argues that the exclusive 
interpretation of logical ‘or’ is a pragmatic implicature rather than reflecting 
a logical limitation, and the same could be true in causal reasoning (Ali et al., 
2010), but regardless of this issue, it would seem that thinking about 
exclusive events may be more familiar or natural for children than thinking 
about independent events. 
That the averaging error here reflects difficulty with the idea of 
independence could explain why children lack understanding of additivity, 
but, importantly, does not account for why children misunderstand 
independent events as involving averaging. More than just lack of 
understanding, this indicates a bias, and one that is fairly resistant to change. 
This account therefore still does not go deep enough. 
In the introduction, we suggested that EV averaging might be a 
generalization from everyday value judgement, as demonstrated previously 
A.Schlottmann, R.M.Harman & J.Paine 
 
15 
in children and adults, but this hypothesis is not correct: The present 
experiments clearly show that children can and do make appropriate 
additive value judgements. So when do children add and when do they 
average?  
In the remainder of this discussion we speculate that adding and 
averaging originate in two different domains. When judging physical 
properties, we typically judge what is seen, the sample presented itself, and 
this may be linked to adding.  When judging social/psychological properties 
in contrast, we typically make a judgement about an underlying property 
from the sample presented and this may be linked to averaging. Value 
belongs to neither domain inherently, but can be linked to either, and this 
may lead to adding or averaging, respectively. To explain how we arrived at 
this view, we next consider that children not only make averaging errors 
where adding is appropriate, but also make additive errors where averaging 
is appropriate. 
Interlude: Additive Errors in Intuitive Physics. Physics distinguishes 
between extensive and intensive properties of a system. Extensive properties 
depend directly on system size, roughly, concepts of amount, such as 
volume, mass, number. Intensive properties, in contrast, do not depend on 
size, and in a homogenous system pertain to every unit of the system; 
examples are density, speed, temperature, or psychophysical properties such 
as color or taste intensity. Important for present purposes is that if you 
combine two systems, then extensive properties combine additively, but 
intensive properties combine by averaging, e.g., 1 l of cold water and 1 l of 
hot water gives 2 l (volume is extensive and additive) of warm water 
(temperature is intensive and combines by averaging).  
When material quantities are combined, children make additive 
judgements of extensive physical properties, shown by the present 
experiments, or see Anderson and Cuneo (1978, Exp 7). On the other hand, 
children have great difficulty with intensive properties, documented since 
Piaget’s (1930) studies of flotation and density, in fact, they make additive, 
extensive errors for intensive properties (Stavy, Strauss, Orpaz & Carmi, 
1982; Paik Cho & Go, 2007). Strikingly, up to 10 years children think that 
when two coloured liquids are combined the resulting colour is darker than 
the darker of the two, rather than lying in between (Jäger & Wilkening, 
2001). Extensive, additive change of physical parameters may be more 
salient to children than intensive change, because when two quantities are 
combined, extensive properties always add, with the result “more” relative 
to either of the source quantities, while intensive change is variable and 
complex; there could be no change at all (in everyday life one often 
combines quantities of the same substance, with identical intensive 
quantities, e.g., filling up a glass of juice), or the change is an increase 
relative to one quantity and a decrease relative to the other. A child may thus 
initially equate combination with additive change, and overgeneralize this to 
intensive properties, leading to what Jäger and Wilkening (2001) call an 
extensivity bias.  
Most important for present purposes, these over-additive errors show 
that adding processes are as basic in development as averaging. The 
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developmental question of adding versus averaging thus appears not only in 
worth judgement, but in intuitive judgement more generally. Over-additive 
errors rule out that EV averaging occurs because the basic intuitive adding-
type process is averaging, with adding an idea from numerical cognition that 
later on also affects intuitive judgement. Rather, both adding and averaging 
processes appear early, and both are occasionally mis-applied. So again, 
when do children add, and when do they average?  
Physical versus Social Judgement. Our current speculation is that the 
two intuitions simply arise in two different domains. Adding is a natural 
response to how-much questions about physical properties, while averaging 
is a natural response to how-much questions about social/psychological 
properties. Adding arises, because, as argued above, when material 
quantities are combined, additive change of extensive properties is highly 
salient, and much more salient than averaging of intensive quantities. 
 Averaging, on the other hand, arises when information about 
social/psychological properties is combined, rather than material quantities. 
In social/psychological judgement we use the information presented to infer 
an underlying property, and a good guess at the underlying property is the 
central tendency, i.e., average, of this information. When combining 
information in such inferences, the amount of information may change 
additively, but amount is not what we judge, rather we judge the underlying 
property, which is typically stable and unchanging, at least within the 
timeframe of judgement. Our judgements become more extreme with more 
information, not because the sample amount is changing, nor because the 
underlying property itself is changing, but because our inference of central 
tendency becomes more reliable with increased sample size. If, for instance, 
children judge how likable a person is (Hendrick et al., 1974) or how 
deserving of Christmas gifts (Schlottmann & Anderson, 1995, 2007), 
knowing two good things about the person rather than one does not make 
them twice as good/deserving, but we can be more certain that our 
judgement is not based on an outlier. Put another way, social judgement is 
typically a population judgement, an inference from the sample, while 
physical judgement is typically a judgement of the sample itself.   
Value judgement does not belong inherently to either domain and can be 
constructed as sample or population judgement. In our riskless chocolate 
case of Experiment 1, what children see is what they get, so they judge how 
happy they are with the sample itself, the amount of chocolate, producing 
additive judgements. Note that in the EV case of Experiment 1, children 
could do the same and additively judge the amount of winning area in the 
samples, which would produce the correct data pattern. But children 
understand uncertainty (see review in Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2011), and 
because they understand that what they see is not what they may get they 
make an inference, a population judgement, going beyond the information 
given. They do not make this inference correctly, but the averaging error 
indicates, paradoxically, that they judge probabilities, not concrete amounts, 
as also found in other tasks (Schlottmann, 2001). It also shows, importantly, 
that additivity is not a reflexive response to stimuli with salient extensive 
properties, but that children can change their frame of reference at will, from 
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judgement of a sample quantity to judgement of the underlying population 
characteristic. 
On face value, our finding of EV additivity with exclusive risky 
outcomes in Experiment 3 does not fit with this interpretation. However, 
two arguments we already made reconcile this study with the present view: 
First, children may have added winning area in Experiment 3, rather than 
component EVs, i.e., they made extensive judgements. Second, the three 
possible alternative outcomes were directly given in Experiment 3, in 
contrast to Experiment 1 with independent events, where the four possible 
alternative outcome combinations must be inferred. Thus, when alternative 
outcomes are shown there is less need for inference than in the independent 
events case. Children might improve with independent events as well, if 
these were re-presented in terms of the four alternative outcome 
combinations. 
Conclusion. In three experiments, children between 5 and 8 years 
judged the worth of multiple outcome situations sometimes by addition, 
sometimes by averaging.  Averaging in the independent events situation 
amounts to a bias that violates the additivity prescription of EV. We 
speculate that averaging occurs because children construct the judgement as 
requiring an inference from the sample presented to an underlying 
population property. Adding occurs, in contrast, when no inference is 
required and children simply judge the sample itself. Exclusive outcome 
representations of risky events allow the latter. More generally, the present 
view predicts that children might be helped to distinguish better between 
judgements requiring addition or averaging, if intensive physical properties 
were introduced by reference to ‘quasi-intensive’ social properties, while 
additive non-material properties might be introduced by reference to 
extensive material properties. Many studies have shown that children have 
functional probability and utility intuitions that structurally correspond to 
the normative prescriptions (Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2011). The 
averaging bias in EV judgements highlights one limitation of these 
intuitions. 
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